Welfare\u27s  Condition X by unknown
Welfare's "Condition X"
Under the Social Security Act,' the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) provides more than half the funds for state wel-
fare programs. The largest component is Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC);2 HEW grants go to low-income families
that meet a level of need determined by the states and in which one
parent has deserted or is dead, incapacitated, or unemployed.8 The
Social Security Act sets certain minimal eligibility criteria, but the
state may further narrow the classes of eligible families. So long as the
state plan does not contravene any of the enumerated federal conditions,
section 602(b) stipulates that HEW "shall" approve it.4
Nevertheless, HEW has added a requirement-Condition X-to
those established by the statute.8 When a state exercises its statutory
option to prescribe stricter eligibility criteria than the ones outlined in
the federal act, HEW approves the plan "only if the classification effect-
ing such [additional] limitation is a rational one in the light of the
purposes of public assistance programs."" On occasion, HEW has in-
voked Condition X in disapproving state welfare schemes. But, largely
because the Social Security Act does not expressly authorize the Depart-
ment to impose such a minimal-rationality requirement, the agency has
relied on X only erratically, without ever clearly articulating either the
origins or the import of the doctrine.
7
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-1394 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1, 1965).
2. Title IV of the Act, now 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1, 1965).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 606-07 (1964).
4. Among the conditions are the following: (1) a uniform, state-wide plan; (2) state
participation; (3) administration by a single state agency; (4) fair hearing for individuals
denied welfare; (5) "proper" administrative methods; (6) state agency reports to HEW,
(7) taking into account other income of a child or relative claiming aid in determining
family need, with a discount allowed up to $50 per month of earned income for each
child under 18; (8) confidentiality of records; (9) opportunity to all individuals to apply
for welfare; (10) notification to law enforcement officials of parental desertion, anti
(11) developing services for both children and parents to promote family welfare. 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a), as amended, (Supp. I, 1965).
In addition, a state may not impose a residence requirement of more than one year.
42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1964).
5. "Condition X" is the name HEW has given the doctrine. For the derivation of the
term, see F. White, Memorandum, Equitable Treatment Under the Public Assistance
Titles, Nov. 5, 1963, at 5 [hereinafter cited as White Memo]. The Memorandum was
drawn up by a research assistant for HEW and does not represent Department policy.
6. A. Willcox, Memorandum Concerning Authority of the Secretary, Under Title IV of
the Social Security Act, to Disapprove Michigan House Bill 145 on the Ground of Its
Limitations on Eligibility, March 25, 1963, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Willcox Memo].
7. In the 1930's HEW invalidated a Georgia quota system which contained racial
limitations. W. BELL, Am To DEPENDENT CHILDREN 35 (1965). In another early use, X
terminated federal aid to an Arizona welfare program which denied aid to Indians. Willcox
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I. The Bases for Condition X
HEW's authority to apply Condition X flows from two sources. First,
the Social Security Act itself should be read impliedly to require the
Department to ensure that AFDC funds go only to state plans rationally
related to the purposes of the federal statute. Second, HEW must apply
Condition X in order to prevent violations of constitutional guarantees
at either the federal or state level in the administration of welfare pro-
grams.
The Statutory Basis. So far, HEW has rationalized its use of Condi-
tion X by invoking the requirement in section 602(a)(5) that state plans
must "provide such methods of administration... as are found by the
Secretary to be necessary for.., proper and efficient operation ...."
From the word "proper," the agency claims the power to pass on the
merits of state welfare eligibility criteria." The argument is unpersua-
sive; the section clearly refers to procedural matters-the "methods of
administration"--and not to substantive standards for eligibility. Al-
ternatively, another justification has drawn on the section 602(a)(4)
right to a hearing for those denied welfare; the guaranty "could have
little meaning," the argument runs, "if the treatment accorded to the
Memo 1; see pp. 1227-28 infra. In the 1950's, HEW announced that state AFDC plans
denying aid to families with illegitimate children would violate X. W. BELL, supra, 67-75.
In 1960 Louisiana announced that it was cutting off some 22.000 children, mostly Negro,
from its AFDC rolls because the children were living in "unsuitable homes." HEW held
a hearing, but did not strike down the Louisiana plan. Instead, Secretary Flemming issued
a ruling that in the future no state could deny AFDC to a family because the child was in
an unsuitable home so long as the child continued to live in the lo'ne. Instcaj, %aeps
"should be taken to correct the situation, or, in the alternative, to arrange for other appro-
priate care of the child"; meanwhile, AFDC should continue. Flemming Ruling. btate
Letter No. 452; HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION pt. IV, § 3435A [herein.
after cited as FEDERAL HANDBOOK]. In 1963 Michigan adopted an AFDC program for families
with an unemployed parent. Since unemployment was defined in terms of eligibility for
unemployment compensation under Michigan laws, the statute failed to cover certain oc-
cupations. HEW ruled that the definition of unemployment violated X. See Willcox Memo.
In refusing federal aid to these programs, HEW never offered either a clear explanation
of Condition X or a comprehensive and consistent explanation of HEW's authority to
promulgate it. (Indeed, at times it was not entirely clear that HEW was applying X; it
must have been, though, because the state plans violated no statutory criteria.) One
commentator suggests that HEW has acted politically in using X. Thus, HEW did not
invalidate Louisiana's "unsuitable home" plan outright, but instead issued a prospective
ruling because President Eisenhower did not want to hurt Republican chances in the 1950
election; the Michigan plan was struck down because President Kennedy did not mind
giving Governor Romney a hard time. STENR, SOCIAL INsECURITY 100, 101-07 (19G6).
We are indebted to the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Columbia University
School of Social Work, for providing much of the material and background information
on Condition X and its use in AFDC and other welfare programs.
8. In a recent transmittal to the states, HEW seemingly, justified the Condition under
the "proper" clause of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(5) (1964). Transmittal No. 77, FEDERAL HANWEooK
pt. IV, § 2220 (March 18, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Transmittal No. 77]. The justification
was given in an interdepartmental memorandum on X. White Memo 5-6.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(5) (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1965).
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individual who appeals were measured against arbitrary standards." 10
This suggestion is equally unappealing; the hearing requirement, fairly
construed, simply assures individual applicants the right to demonstrate
their eligibility under criteria already established by the state.
A stronger statutory argument for Condition X is that HEW has an
implied administrative power to ensure the use of federal funds in a
manner rationally related to the goals of the federal program. Section
601 specifies the purpose of the Act as
encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or
in the homes of relatives... [first] to help maintain and strengthen
family life and [second] to help such parents or relatives to attain
or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal
independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing par-
ental care and protection."'
Although section 602(b) states that the HEW Secretary "shall approve"
state plans which violate none of the conditions enumerated in section
602(a), this seemingly mandatory language should be harmonized with
the purposes announced in section 601, which authorizes the yearly
appropriation of funds to finance state plans "approved by the Secre-
tary." Congress could hardly have intended in section 602 to compel
HEW to channel these funds to state programs at loggerheads with the
federal policy announced in section 601. The Secretary should have
the inherent authority to reject a state plan which bears no rational
relation to any purpose of the federal act.
Congress has approved such a reading of the statutory language to
reconcile the apparent conflict between the adjoining sections. Even if
re-enactments of sections 601 and 60212 provide only the slight prop of
"legislative acquiescence," Congress has on other occasions effectively
ratified HEW orders promulgated under Condition X.13 For example,
when Louisiana severed some 20,000 youngsters (mostly Negro) from
the welfare rolls in 1961 by denying benefits to children in "unsuitable
homes," HEW responded with the "Flemming ruling," which an-
10. White Memo 6.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
12. In 1962 Congress re-enacted the welfare programs, including AFDC (formerly ADC),
76 Stat. 185 (1962).
13. See White Memo 8-11.
It would be difficult to find a clearer case of Congressional acquiescence in an adminis.
trative interpretation. With full knowledge, Congress twice gave thorough considera.
tion to states' fiscal problems resulting from the interpretation [of HEW's precursor
in applying X to state plans which excluded Indians].
Id. 11.
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nounced a prospective disapproval of all such denials.1 4 Congress modi-
fied the ruling to give the states added time to comply, but never ques-
tioned HEW's authority to act.' 5 The floor manager of the bill in the
Senate stated that the legislation did nothing more than override "the
effective date" of the agency ruling.'0
An implied statutory authorization for HEW to examine state wel-
fare plans for minimal rationality and furtherance of federal policy
also flows from the consideration that such programs are otherwise
unlikely to undergo any scrutiny at all. The agency cannot depend on
individual litigation to serve the reviewing function. The applicant
whom the state declares ineligible will be reluctant and ill-equipped
to attack the substantive provisions of the program; despite legal aid,
the very poor still find private actions too difficult and time-consuming
to pursue, especially where the state is the adversary. A lawsuit if begun
becomes moot when the complainant moves or gets a job, or when the
state, fearing an adverse outcome, suddenly reverses itself and admits
the plaintiff to the welfare rolls. The court may decide for the plaintiff,
but on a technical basis, pertinent only to the claim under dispute
rather than to the substantive issues. Years may pass before a court ever
passes on the validity of the state program.
7
On the other hand, when HEW invokes Condition X to disapprove
14. See note 7 supra.
15. Now 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1964).
16. 107 CoxG. REc. 6388 (1961) (remarks of Senator Byrd). For history of this provision.
see SENATE FINANCE CozMM., ADC BENEFrrS To Cumznmn OF UN~sMPLOYD PAM.TS, S. REP.
No. 165, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., 6 (1961).
In the 1960 amendments to the Old Age Assistance Program of the Social Security Act,
Congress added an explicit statutory provision resembling >. State plans must
include reasonable standards, consistent with the objectives of this subchapter, for
determining eligibility for and the extent of such assistance....
42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(10)(B) (1964).
It might seem that Congress enacted Condition X into the law for that program alone,
and so has not for any other. But it is not at all dear that Congress had anything like X
in mind. The only legislative discussion referred to financial standards. Hotse Cos.E 1. o%
WAYS AND MEANS, SOCIAL SEcuRTY ANIENDMENTS OF 1960, H. R. REP. No. 1799, 86th Cong..
2d Sess., 132 (1960). In any case, the failure to amend the program (then ADC) at the same
time to include such a provision clearly is not attributable to any conscious intent to deny
HEW the authority to use X in the AFDC program; Congress was immersed in debate
over a medicare-type proposal and was not considering AFDC at all. See also SENATE
FINANCE COMM., SOCIAL SECURITY A.MENDMENTS OF 1960, S. RE'. NO. 1856, 86th Cong.. 2d
Sess. (1960).
In 1962 Congress added an identical provision in a new Title XVI of the Act, now 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381-85. Title XVI simply incorporated all the conditions from the enumerated
programs; thus the "reasonable standard" provision was simply copied from the Old Age
Assistance Program. There was no contemplation of, or discussion of, AFDC, and no
consideration of Condition X. See SENATE FINANCE CoMMs., Pu3Ic AWmrxsut AME.%Eo NT-rs
OF 1962, S. REP. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Ses., at 34 (1962).
17. The problems of judicial review for the individual welfare recipient are fully
discussed in Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L REv. 84
(1967).
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a state classification, the state can secure quick and effective review of
the disputed criterion's validity. Section 1316 of the Act provides for an
agency hearing when HEW rejects a proposed state plan or an amend-
ment to an existing plan, from which the state can appeal to a federal
Court of Appeals.' 8 HEW can, moreover, avoid unnecessary disruption
of existing programs by delaying the effective date of its order in
appropriate circumstances until the hearing and appeal have been com-
pleted.
Another reason to interpret the Act to authorize Condition X is the
usefulness of the doctrine as a tool of administrative expertise. The
Social Security Act is unusually complex, and HEW has inherited the
primary responsibility for interpreting and applying the statute. HEW's
determination-with a full hearing and findings of fact-whether a
state's conditions are consistent with the purposes of the federal act
provides a record for judicial review which often will present a fuller
development of the issues than private litigation.
The Constitutional Basis. HEW may justify on two bases the use of
Condition X to determine whether a state program, either on its face
or as applied, violates the Constitution. First, the Department should
examine the state programs it funds for possible unconstitutionality if
it is itself to act within constitutional limits. Without Condition X,
HEW might finance a state program meeting all the enumerated re-
quirements in section 602(a), but still, say, discriminating against
Negroes. Such federal financing of unconstitutional state action would
violate the Fifth Amendment under Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hospital.9 There the Fourth Circuit invalidated a federal statute
authorizing funds for state use in building hospitals because the law
permitted the construction of "separate but equal" facilities. The court
held both that state maintenance of the segregated hospital violated
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause and that federal
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. I, 1965).
19. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). Cf. Burton v.
Wilmington Park Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961):
As the Chancellor pointed out, in its lease with Eagle the Authority could have af-
firmatively required Eagle to discharge the responsibilities under the Fourteenth
Amendment imposed upon the private enterprise as a consequence of state participa-
tion. But no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them
or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may be. . . . By its in-
action, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made itself a party to
the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind
the admitted discrimination.
For discussion, see Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72
YA LJ. 1347, 1359 (1963).
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provisions authorizing such maintenance independently violated the
Fifth Amendment due process clause.
Second, HEW may examine state plans simply to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment limitations on state action. No authority either
recognizes or denies the inherent power of a federal agency to pass on
the constitutionality of state programs to which the agency distributes
federal funds.20 In such circumstances, the controlling consideration
should be the wisdom and appropriateness of such agency review. Since
the alternative of relying on piecemeal private litigation promises at
best piecemeal judicial review, and since HEW must for independent
reasons make a systematic inspection of state welfare schemes,2' the
Department should apply Condition X at the constitutional level to
ensure federal scrutiny of such programs.
For both statutory and constitutional reasons, therefore, HEW has
the power to invoke Condition X in supervising state AFDC plans. The
1954 decision in Arizona v. Ewinge shows the doctrine in operation at
both levels. There HEW's predecessor, the Federal Security Agency,
refused to fund an Arizona welfare program excluding reservation
Indians from coverage. Although the court rejected the FSA theory
that the state program was racially discriminatory, it found that the
exclusion (premised on federal ability to support the Indians) was
arbitrary, and denied Arizona's claim that FSA had no power to dis-
approve the plan merely for its arbitrariness: "[T]he Administrator
20. Administrative agencies "commonly" hold that they have no power to hold statutes
unconstitutional, 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINIsmATIVE LAW § 20.04 (1958). But Professor Davis notes
that
[a] fundamental distinction must be recognized between constitutional applicability
of legislation to particular facts and constitutionality of the legislation. . . . We
commit to administrative agencies the power to determine constitutional applicability,
but we do not commit to administrative agencies the power to determine constitu-
tionality of legislation.
Id. 74.
In other words, though an agency cannot determine that the legislation under which
it acts is constitutional (in HEW's case, the Social Security Act), it can determine the
constitutionality of particular situations under its control. The latter power seems settled
under Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (NLRB may determine
whether respondent company can constitutionally be held to be within "interstate com-
merce').
The NLRB may have performed a function not significantly different from HEW's
application of X when it extended the duty of fair representation first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & N.IR., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Professor Sovern
argues that in the Hughes Tool case, Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964), the
Board went beyond the Steele duty of fair representation for non-members and seemed to
rely directly on the Constitution in finding a union duty (fairly) to process members' griev-
ance complaints. M. SovERN, LEGAL RESrRAINTS ON RACIAL DISucrIINATIon IN E!,--LOYsF-r
at ch. 6, n.34 (footnotes at 58) (1966). See id., ch. 6.
21. See pp. 1225-26 supra.
22. Civil No. 2008-52 (D.D.C. 1954) (unreported). The case was affirmed, but on a juris.
dictional ground not reaching the merits, Arizona v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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could not, constitutionally, or under the terms of the statute, itself,
probably for that matter, approve a plan predicated . . . upon the
present statute .... "
II. Possible Applications of Condition X
HEW should apply Condition X in its dual role to clarify the outlines
of federal welfare policy and to help sharpen the contours of relevant
constitutional provisions. Under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not limit welfare payments in an
invidious manner once it elects to maintain the program, even though
it could validly abandon the system entirely.23 Classifications that fail
to promote the purposes of the act they supposedly serve violate the
clause, at least where they also bear no discernible relation to any other
valid state policy. Even where state action furthers a welfare purpose,
HEW may still invoke X at the constitutional level if the state conduct
violates some other constitutional provision. And even if state action
passes all constitutional tests, HEW may still apply Condition X
statutorily to suspend federal payments if the state plan conflicts with
the purposes of the federal act.
24
Midnight Raids. One practice of dubious validity under Condition
X is the "midnight welfare raid." Some county welfare boards employ
"sneak attacks," occasionally late at night, to ferret out violations of
welfare eligibility provisions. A common objective is to catch a sup-
posedly husbandless mother living with a man.25 These degrading in-
trusions frustrate the explicit AFDC statutory purpose of enabling
the parent "to attain or retain capability for . maximum self-support
and personal independence .... -20
Furthermore, as Professor Reich has argued, 27 welfare raids violate
the Fourth Amendment. Public assistance recipients cannot be said to
23. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963):
[I]n Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) the Court recognized with respect to
Federal Social Security benefits that "[t]he interest of a covered employee under the
Act is of sufficient substance to fall within the protection from arbitrary government
action afforded by the Due Process Clause."
24. Instead of the current sporadic enforcement of X, HEW should apply X in a more
vigorous and uniform fashion. HEW should hold a hearing whenever a state plan "color-
ably" violates X. The state plans and conditions discussed in the text immediately fol.
lowing this footnote are among those thought to be colorable violations of the Condition,
HEW should set up an office to examine claims by individual welfare recipients that the
state condition under which they have been excluded violates X.
25. See Parrish v. Alameda Civil Serv. Comm'n, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 425 P.2d 223 (1967).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
27. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALn L.J. 1317
(1963). ,
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consent to such invasions of their homes except on the grossest of
fictions. Welfare searches may not seek evidence for criminal prosecu-
tions, but they surely resemble a proceeding for forfeiture of benefits.
HEW has announced that states may not adopt enforcement pro-
cedures that invade the privacy or violate the constitutional rights of
recipients. s "By way of illustration," the agency has warned against
such tactics as "entering a home by force, or without permission, or
under false pretenses, making home visits outside of working hours, and
particularly making such visits during sleeping hours...."- But the
ruling and illustrations do not cover searches where the welfare investi-
gator "requests" admittance. The limit is unsound. As the California
Supreme Court held last March, such requests are inherently coercive.30
HEW can and should proscribe all state welfare raids rather than
merely frown upon them "by way of illustration."
Conditioning Welfare on Return to Another State. In 1962 a New
York welfare official denied AFDC assistance to an otherwise eligible
mother on the ground that, although she met the residence require-
ment, her own "best interest" required that she return to her native
state.31 As an inducement, the New York agency offered to pay trans-
portation costs. HEW should subject such repatriation schemes to
Condition X scrutiny. At the statutory level HEW should first deter-
mine whether the state in fact has the best interests of the welfare
recipient at heart or merely seeks to cleanse its welfare rolls by farming
out "undesirables" to other states. The latter objective, if truly the
motivating force underlying such rules, bears no relation to any purpose
of the federal statute. Second, even where HEW finds a state promoting
repatriation plans in good faith, the Department should still determine
whether such a state policy conflicts with the federal objective of foster-
ing independence in aid recipients. It seems within the scope of HEW's
expertise in administering the federal act to decide that telling people
where they ought to live does not imbue them with a sense of responsi-
bility for managing their own affairs.
The repatriation plans may also call for the application of Condition
X in its constitutional form. The right of an American to live in what-
ever state he chooses is a privilege of national citizenship established
28. Transmittal No. 77.
29. Id.
30. Parrish v. Alameda Civil Serv. Comm'n, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628-30, 425 P.2d 223,
229 (1967).
31. In re Appeal of Minnie Lee Nixon, N.Y. Dept. of Social Welfare (Dec. 1, 1964). Upon
a rehearing by the Department, Mrs. Nixon received her grant; the Department did not
reach the substantive constitutional issues.
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by The Slaughter-House Cases.82 A state inducement to forego the
privilege may constitute a deprivation within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibition or an unconstitutional condition in derogation of the
right.
Minor Unmarried Mother Rule. Louisiana requires an unwed
mother under twenty-one to live with her own mother in order to re-
ceive AFDC payments, unless her mother's community would experi-
ence "moral outrage" at her presence.88 In addition, the state gives aid
to the girl only where both the father of her child has deserted her and
her own father has deserted her mother.3 4 What relation these restric-
tions can have to the purposes of the federal program is a riddle. The
rules seek to deter illegitimacy, but the most charitable conclusion
possible is that they have hit upon an awkward way of going about it.
They cannot be justified as promoting the "best interests" of the baby,
since once the child's parents and grandparents fail to satisfy a complex
web of living-arrangement requirements, he himself loses all state aid.
The rules are also suspect constitutionally. One commentator has
suggested that they may seek to eliminate Negro mothers from the
welfare rolls: 5 presumably the white community is shocked by the
presence of a young unwed mother with bastard child, while the Negro
community is not.
Substitute Father Rule. Several states deny or reduce welfare where
a man neither married to the mother nor father to her children lives in
her home or cohabits with her there.3 6 HEW should examine such rules
at the statutory level for two reasons. First, if the regulations seek only
to punish the mother for her sex life, they conflict with the federal
purpose in denying aid to needy children solely because of their
mother's amoral behavior. Second, in the states where the rules rest on
an irrebuttable presumption that a man sleeping with a woman must
be supporting her children, they may violate HEW's policy that each
applicant's case must be individually evaluated. 37
32. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1872).
33. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE MANUAL § 2-749C(2)(b) (reissued Jan. 1, 1966).
34. Id. However, if the girl's own parents are living together, the girl's child may be
eligible for AFDC if the girl's parents are themselves eligible for AFDC. Id. § 2-749C(l)(a),
85. Interview with Edward V. Sparer, Director, Center on Social Welfare Policy and
Law, Columbia University School of Social Work, in New Haven, Conn., April 1967.
36. See, e.g., ALABAMA MANUAL OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION pt. I, ch. II, subd.
V(A); ARIZONA MANUAL OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE § 3-403, 6(D); CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL VELFARE MANUAL § C-155; GEORGIA 'ANUAL OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE § V(3)(5); LoUisi-
ANA MANUAL OF PUBLIC WELFARE § 2-742.2; MISSISSIPPI MANUAL OF PUBLIC WELFARE Vol.
III, § D, 4512.
37. HEW has issued a ruling declaring that:
[r]educed assistance payments based on assumed receipt of support payments or any
1280
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At the constitutional level, HEW should scrutinize the substitute
father rules to determine whether the underlying presumptions are so
unreasonable as to violate due process under Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v.
Turnipseed.38 There the Supreme Court upheld a prima facie presump-
tion of negligence from the fact of a railroad accident, but warned
that a legislative inference of the dispositive fact from mere evidence
of another fact would violate due process if no "rational connection
[existed] between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed," and
if the presumption "operate[d] to preclude the party from the right to
present his defense to the main fact thus presumed."3 9 In Heiner v.
Donnan,40 the Court invalidated a statutory presumption that a trans-
fer of property made within two years before the death of the donor
is deemed to have been made in contemplation of death. The Court
found the presumption arbitrary and irrational, and also noted that
"a statute creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair oppor-
tunity to rebut it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 41
The substitute father rule thus violates due process for two reasons.
First, it creates an arbitrary presumption; there is no a priori reason to
assume that a man acting as surrogate husband must also be acting as
surrogate father to children he has no legal duty to support. Here the
courts are likely to rely on HEW's determination of the extent to which
actual practice diverges from the premise underlying the presumption.
Second, even if experience shows that the presumption is not arbitrary,
it still falls because the applicant may not disprove the dispositive fact
presumed in her case; although the mother might establish non-support
of her children, she still loses her AFDC payments because she is per-
mitted to rebut only the fact of illegal relationship and nothing more.
Employable Mother Rule. In some states, an unemployed mother
must take work whenever her welfare board determines that a "suit-
other income that is not, in fact, available are inconsistent with the welfare agency's
responsibility for meeting need and strengthening family life. They result in inequity
in meeting the continuing needs of the families affected.
Transmittal No. 86, F.VEDEALH H-DBOOK pt. IV, § 3124 (July 6, 1966). HEW declared that as
of July, 1967, such provisions will not be allowed. Id. While the language seemingly covers
reduced payments on the presumption of support from a substitute father, it is not clear
that the ruling was intended to cover this area. The transmittal lists a number of exam-
pies to which the ruling applies, but it does not discuss the substitute father rule. HEW
should make clear that its order covers such rules, or it should independently apply X to
the rules.
38. 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
39. Id. at 43.
40. 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
41. Id. at 329.
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able" job is "available" to her. If she refuses the position, the state
terminates her welfare. In Georgia, if she accepts the job, the state
also terminates her welfare, even if she earns less than the AFDC mini-
mal-income grant level. 42 Such rules have a particularly severe impact
in the South, where they force mothers to endure seasonal labor as field
hands or domestics at wages far below the AFDC level.
4
The statutory relevance of Condition X is apparent. Encouraging
employment does not conflict with federal statutory policy. But forcing
the mother to leave her children either untended or in the care of
some third party while she works outside the home hardly promotes
the express section 601 purposes of "maintaining and strengthening
family life" and assuring "continuing parental care and protection. ... "
In addition, some states with the employable mother rule act irration-
ally since they allow the mother to receive income from other sources-
such as social security, alimony, boarding-house lodgers, and part-time
work-without either terminating or reducing AFDC benefits.
44
The constitutional relevance of Condition X is equally clear. If
southern states use the rules to generate a cheap Negro labor supply,
they violate the equal protection clause. The Georgia rule also denies
due process by ending all AFDC assistance to a mother earning less
than the welfare grant level for no legitimate state purpose.4 6
Maximum Family Grants. Every state calculates payments to each
family according to the number of dependent children. But several
states limit the lump-sum payment that any one family may receive;
their rules establish an absolute ceiling, without regard to how needy
the family is or how many "surplus" children it has. 40 Again, HEW
should look to possible conflicts with federal policy. Economies of
scale are not unlimited; a child may be as needy in a large family as in
a small one. To the extent that the rules impel large families to farm
42. Georgia's employable mother rule is now under challenge in Anderson v. Schaefer,
Civil No. 10443 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
43. See, e.g., LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL § 2-337:
D. Employment is available to a person within the meaning of [the rule] if:
2. the labor supply in the community does not meet the demand for the type of
work that the person can do. This is true of domestic servants in most communi-
ties on a year-round basis and of other jobs on certain areas during certain sea-
sons of the year. In such cases no specific offer of employment need be shown.
44. See Brief for Plaintiffs on their Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunctions at 3, 17, Anderson v. Schaefer, Civil No. 10443 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
45. HEW has issued an "advice" to the states, recommending that employable mother
rules be abandoned. FEDERAL HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 3401.1.
46. The maximum grant provision in Iowa was struck down by the Iowa Supreme Court
as violating the equal protection clause of the Iowa State Constitution. Collins v. State
Board of Social Welfare, 248 Ia. 369, 81 N.W.2d 4 (1957).
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out children to other relatives, they frustrate the section 601 purpose
of maintaining "continuing parental care and protection.
'4 7
The constitutional objections to the family maximum rule also
warrant HEW's examination. If one result of the rule-and perhaps
the reason for it-is to discourage welfare families from having too
many children, it effectively inhibits exercise of the right to raise a
family of chosen size when a couple is dependent on the state for finan-
cial support. Such a rule strikes at the family relationship on a ground
that courts have increasingly regarded as invidiously discriminatory un-
der the equal protection clause. A differentiation based solely on
poverty and a chilling effect on family life together raise a Fourteenth
Amendment question 8 warranting careful Condition X inspection.
47. Children may live with certain specified relatives other than their parents and still
be eligible for AFDC. 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1965).
48. Poverty is a constitutionally suspect classification in the area of obtaining criminal
justice. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). It is invalid in other areas, such
as the right to vote. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). It
may be suspect in other important areas, such as the right to raise a family; cf. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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